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CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC: THE CASE OF THE “EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE” 
1. Introduction 
The project for a European civil code has been on the political agenda for over 35 
years. As early as 1974, Winfried M. Hauschild, at that time Head of Division in the 
Directorate General for the Internal Market of the Commission of the then European 
Communities, is supposed to have said at a symposium at the Copenhagen 
Business School: “We need a European Code of Obligations”.1 In the 1980s, support 
from Community institutions became more substantial. The Directorate General for 
the Internal Market and Claus Ehlerman, Director General of the Legal Services of 
the Commission of the European Communities funded meetings of lawyers 
preparing “Principles of European Contract Law”.2 At the end of that decade, the 
European Parliament started to support the idea of a European civil code.3 In the 
first decade of the new millennium, the European Commission provided some 
funding, for example by granting a contract to researchers working on a “Common 
Frame of Reference”.4 
 
This support from Community officials and politicians was well received by 
academic scholars, who were (or are) participating in the various groups working 
on the “Europeanisation” of private law. Their names are probably familiar to those 
interested in the plans for drafting a “European civil code: Piero Guido Alpa, Stathis 
Banakas, Jürgen Basedow, Friedrich Blase, Hugh Collins, Ulrich Drobnig, Giuseppe 
Gandolfi, Konstantinos Kerameus, Ole Lando, Martijn Willem Hesselink, Ugo 
Mattei, Stefano Rodotà, Hans–Peter Schwintowski, Winfried Tilmann, Christian von 
Bar and, so it seems, Reinhard Zimmermann. Interestingly, these academics, and 
 
* Associate professor University of Groningen the Netherlands. 
1  O. Lando/H. Beale (eds.), The Principles of European Contract Law Part. I: Performance, Non–
Performance and Remedies(Dordrecht/Boston/London 1994), ix. 
2  Lando/Beale, The Principles, ix–x. 
3  OJ C 158 (1989), 400–401. OJ C 205 (1994), 518–519. 
4  OJ C 140 E (2002), 538–542. COM (2001) 398 final, 14–15 and 16–17. COM (2003) 68 final, 16–
17 and 23–24. COM (2004) 651 final, 8–9 and 12–13. 
 Constitutive Rhetoric: the Case of the “European Civil Code” 
46 
others, do not limit themselves to carrying the plans for a “European private law” 
into effect. They also spent a substantial amount of words on raising arguments in 
favour of the project. Unsurprisingly, the activities, papers and drafts of these 
academics provoked critical responses of other scholars, who question the 
desirability and feasibility of a European civil code.5 
 
It seems, however, that in this debate, the advocates and the opponents of this new 
civil code do not operate on the same level of reasoning. Critics of the project seem 
to focus on questions of a legal or practical nature, for example whether the 
European Union has the competence to enact a uniform civil code, whether the 
(English) common law and the (continental) civil law can be merged into one 
uniform civil code, whether the differences in language do not constitute an 
insurmountable obstacle, or how a European Supreme Court would be able to deal 
with civil cases from all over the European Union. Advocates of the project, on the 
contrary, seem to have little patience with these kind of “problems” regarding the 
feasibility of the project. This gives the debate a peculiar character, as if both sides 
are not actually discussing the same issue. It is the aim of this contribution to 
explain this specific feature of the debate, by analysing the nature of the arguments 
that are brought forward by the scholars that support the case for a uniform 
European civil code. This analysis will start by putting the reasoning of these 
scholars in a historical perspective, and will subsequently apply the theory of 
constitutive rhetoric on their argumentation. 
 
Constitutive rhetoric is generally regarded as a species of ordinary rhetoric, in the 
sense that it is a theory that attempts to explain how a group of persons can be 
convinced to support a specific decision.6 The distinctive feature of constitutive 
rhetoric is that it does not aim to directly persuade the public of a specific step to be 
taken, by using arguments that are specifically targeting the issue at hand. On the 
contrary, it first focuses on transforming the audience into a community. Once a 
community is created, various decisions will more–or–less automatically follow 
from being a member of this community, without the need for specific arguments in 
favour of those decisions. Constitutive rhetoric is, therefore “logically (if not also 
temporally) prior to persuasive rhetoric”.7 Constitutive rhetoric can have this effect, 
because it operates from an “ideology” understood as “a network of interconnected 
convictions that functions in a man epistemically and that shapes his identity by 
 
5  Among others: Y. Lequette, “Vers un code civil européen?” in: Pouvoirs. Revue Française 
d’Études Constitutionelles et Politiques 107 (2003), 97–126. S.S. Lorenzo, “What do we mean 
when we say “folklore”? Cultural and axiological diversities as a limit for a European private 
law” in: European Review of Private Law 14/2 (2006), 197–219. P. Legrand, “Antivonbar” in: The 
Journal of Comparative Law 1 (2006), 13–40. W.J. Zwalve, “Een “Common Frame of Reference” 
als Europees Burgerlijk Wetboek?” in: Weekblad voor Privaatrecht en Notarieel Recht 6789 
(March 2009), 191–193. 
6  M. Charland, “Constitutive rhetoric: the case of the Peuple Québécois” in: The Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 73 (1987), 133–150. 
7  M. Charland, “Constitutive rhetoric” in: T. Sloan, Encyclopedia of Rhetoric (Oxford 2001), 616–
619 (617). 
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determining how he views the world”.8 An ideology usually pretends to present “a 
self–evidently meaningful world”, denying “historicity” and “contradictions”.9 
 
Three features of constitutive rhetoric can be distinguished. Firstly, the style and the 
language merit attention. By using a specific concept, it is encouraged to view the 
facts of a given situation in a particular manner, with some facts made more 
noticeable than others”, a process that is also called “framing”.10 More often than 
not, such a concept is part of a pair of opposing concepts, sometimes referred to as a 
“distinction” or, if a break with an original unity is emphasised, a “dissociation”.11 
Since constitutive rhetoric is about creating a new (political) entity, it is, for 
example, likely to encounter the opposing pair of words “we” and “they”. Secondly, 
in the context of creating a political community by means of constitutive rhetoric, 
narratives are essential.12 After all, if a community is presented as the subject of a 
story, its existence in the real world is claimed. In this way, narratives open the road 
to identification and, thus, facilitate the creation of identity. It should be pointed out 
that paradoxes are an inevitable ingredient of constitutive rhetoric and especially of 
narratives, because narratives presume the existence of the audience they seek to 
constitute by their discourse.13 Thirdly, since constitutive rhetoric is prior to 
persuasive rhetoric, practical arguments targeting a specific issue will play a minor 
role. The way in which concrete arguments in favour of a concrete proposal and 
practical objections to that proposal are dealt with by those applying constitutive 
rhetoric should not be taken at face value, but treated from the perspective of the 
aim of constitutive rhetoric, namely the constitution of an audience. 
 
The structure of this contribution is as follows. Firstly, it will be argued that from a 
historical perspective, the decisive argument in favour of uniform codifications of 
private law that were brought about around 1800, and particularly the French Code 
civil (1804), was of a political, or more precisely of a constitutional nature. This civil 
code was brought about as part of the process of creating, or constituting, a 
(national) political community. Secondly, it will be argued that the reasoning of the 
academics who support the plans for a European civil code is of a predominantly 
constitutional nature as well. They are convinced that such a code is necessary in 
view of the political unification of Europe, since it can strengthen the identity of the 
European people. Thirdly, it will be argued that since the case of the proponents of 
a European code is predominantly founded on an argument of a constitutional 
 
8  E. Black, “The second persona” in: The Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970), 109–119 (113). Cf. 
also M. Charland, “Constitutive rhetoric” (2001), 618: an ideology is “the naturalised 
representation of cultural categories that legitimate power”. 
9  Charland, “Constitutive rhetoric” (1987), 148 (footnote 1). 
10  J.A. Kuypers, “Framing analysis from a rhetorical perspective” in: P. D’Angelo/J.A.Kuypers 
(eds.), Doing news framing analysis. Empirical and theoretical perpectives (New York/London 
2010), 286–311 (300). 
11  C. Perelman/L. Olbrechts–Tyteca, The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation (Notre Dame, 
Indiana 1971), § 89–90. 
12  Charland, “Constitutive rhetoric” (2001), 617. 
13  Charland, “Constitutive rhetoric” (2001), 617–618. 
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nature, it is likely that their approach to the debate will be in line with the theory of 
constitutive rhetoric. This could explain the particular quality of the debate 
mentioned above. 
 
At this stage, two final remarks are required. Firstly, the concept of “(constitutive) 
rhetoric” should be stripped of its negative connotations. As Perelman and 
Olbrechts–Tyteca have argued convincingly, rhetoric becomes an ordinary 
phenomenon once it is accepted that truth is intersubjective, dependent on the 
reception by the public, and that it has limited value as guidance in the process of 
decision making.14 This means that everybody uses rhetorical techniques, and that it 
is also in principle legitimate to do so. One should only be conscious of the use of 
(constitutive) rhetoric and try to understand how it can influence a debate. It is the 
purpose of this contribution to illustrate this, not to pass a moral judgment.15 
Secondly, since everybody uses rhetorical techniques, it is likely that the opponents 
of a European civil code will also do so. An article written by arguably the fiercest 
critic, Pierre Legrand, immediately confirms this: it bears the title “Antivonbar”, 
which seems to be a typical ad personam argument directed at Christian von Bar.16 In 
the contribution at hand, however, the focus will be on the use of constitutive 
rhetoric in the debate on whether or not to codify “European private law”, not on 
the use of rhetoric in general. For that reason, the reasoning of the opponents of a 
European civil code will not be analysed in this contribution, at least not as to their 
use of rhetorical techniques. 
 
2. A historical perspective on codification 
Around 1800, codifications were introduced in France (Cc 1804), the Netherlands 
(WNH 1809), Prussia (ALR 1794), and the Austrian Monarchy (ABGB 1811).17 The 
first two codes of law, the Cc (1804) and the WNH (1809), were introduced in states 
in which a revolution had put an end to the Ancien Régime. Both codifications had 
two important characteristics. First, the force of these codes of law was formally 
declared to be exclusive. This meant that in the fields of law covered by the 
codification no rules existed outside that codification that could be recognised as 
law. Therefore, judges had to decide cases on the basis of the codification alone. 
Another important characteristic of these two codifications is that they brought 
about legal unity, meaning that the rules in these codifications were the same 
throughout the territory of the state. They, thus, put an end to the legal diversity 
that had been a distinctive feature of the legal systems of the states on the European 
continent for many centuries. The two other codes, the ALR (1794) and the ABGB 
 
14  Perelman/Olbrechts–Tyteca, The new rhetoric, “Introduction” and §16. 
15  This does not mean, of course, that the use of rhetorical techniques is beyond moral 
evaluation. See Black, “The second persona”, 109–119. 
16  Legrand, “Antivonbar”, 13. Cf. Perelman/Olbrechts–Tyteca, The new rhetoric, §18. 
17  See for references related to this paragraph: Peter A.J. van den Berg, The politics of European 
codification. A history of the unification of law in France, Prussia, the Austrian Monarchy and the 
Netherlands (Groningen 2007). 
P. van den Berg 
 49 
(1811), were introduced in states where there had not been a radical constitutional 
change. Nevertheless, even in these two states the old legal doctrine was 
abandoned. In the Austrian–Hungarian Empire, this break was as clean as in France 
and the Netherlands: the ABGB also had exclusive force. In Prussia less drastic 
action was taken. The ALR was designed as a code with only subsidiary force, 
which would operate alongside various provincial codes that had primary force. 
Still, legislation became the only source of law in Prussia too. Rules that were not 
included either in the ALR or in the provincial codices that had received royal assent 
were rescinded. However, both the ALR and the ABGB were less radical than their 
revolutionary counterparts, the Cc in France and the WNH in the Netherlands, in at 
least one important respect: they were not aimed at complete territorial legal unity. 
In Prussia, the various provincial codes that were to be drafted were to have 
primary force in the intended regions. In the Austro–Hungarian Empire, it was 
specifically stated that the ABGB was not be put into force in Hungary, introducing 
territorial legal unity only in the German and Bohemian parts of the Empire. 
 
Two different types of arguments were brought forward to support the introduction 
of these codifications, each of them reflecting its specific features. Firstly, there are 
arguments of a juridical nature in which the focus is on the beneficial effect of a 
codification for the litigant. Here, the typical argument or line of reasoning is that a 
codification leads to increased legal certainty. This will result in a reduction of the 
costs of litigation, because it will be easier for lawyers and judges to handle cases. In 
the more radical version of this argument, it is held that a codification will make it 
possible for a litigant to understand his legal position himself. It should be 
emphasised, however, that in a juridical argumentation, uniformity is usually not 
deemed a necessary feature of the proposed codification. An analysis of the Cahiers 
the doléances that were brought to the French Estates General in 1788–1789 clearly 
shows that codification was usually asked for on the basis of arguments of a 
juridical nature and that as a result the desired code needed not be uniform. 
Juridical arguments were also important in the build–up to the ALR, which explains 
that it was – at least initially – not aimed at realising legal unity. 
 
Secondly, there were arguments of a political nature, meaning that codification was 
used in the process of formation of (national) states. Two different subtypes of 
arguments can be distinguished here. The first category of arguments is of a 
practical political nature, meaning that a codification is supposed to provide the 
state with more money by simultaneously increasing its revenues and reducing the 
costs of government. Arguments of this category focus on economic and 
bureaucratic aspects of government. In particular, it is held that a better judicial 
system strengthens the state, because it furthers the economic activities of the 
citizens. This argument was the trademark of the mercantilists, or cameralists as 
they were referred to in the German territories. Most mercantilists believed that a 
codification would bring legal certainty and would thus lead to a reduction of the 
number and length of legal procedures. As a result, subjects would have more 
money to spend on other things. This, of course, resembles the juridical argument, 
but the difference is that mercantilists emphasised the benefits of this for the state, 
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for example the increased taxability of citizens. As with the juridical argument, the 
proposed codification usually did not aim at establishing legal unity. Legal certainty 
was the main aim. Consequently, mercantilists considered additional measures, 
such as a reform of the judicial organisation, as at least equally important. A 
minority of the mercantilists also argued that the state might benefit from a 
codification as it would facilitate trade between the various regions. Obviously, the 
latter favoured a codification that was uniform throughout the territory. The 
bureaucratic argument is related to this; a uniform codification would make it easier 
to administer the country. After all, the legal system would become more 
transparent and enable the state to move bureaucrats from one region to another. 
 
The second category of arguments is of a political–theoretical nature. It is based on a 
constitutional logic, derived from Rousseau’s political theory of popular 
sovereignty. Rousseau compared the state with a human body. It was a moral 
political body, which was supposed to have a will of its own, the well–known 
volonté générale. Laws were the expression of this will and to be compared to the 
brains of a body.18 In this context, Rousseau emphasised two aspects of these laws. 
First, he argued that each state should have its own specific laws that would 
provide it with a distinguishable identity. Each state should have its own traditions, 
habits and character. Secondly, he forcefully pleaded for these laws to be uniform. 
Legal unity was a necessary corollary of the state as one political body. If laws are 
the expression of the volonté générale of this body, it is difficult to imagine legal 
diversity. It is important to point out that, according to Rousseau, the political 
community was not a pre–existing entity. It had to be created, and codification was 
a perfect means to that end. In fact, these codifications were meant to constitute a 
coherent political entity. For that reason, it is hardly surprising that the Code civil is 
sometimes referred to as the proper constitution of France.19 
 
The constitutional argument turned out to be the most effective one, at least with 
regard to the introduction of uniform codifications. The juridical argument was, of 
course, invoked now and then, but it hardly ever resulted in a unified code without 
the use of other arguments. The practical political arguments were invoked more 
successfully, particularly the second economic argument related to intra–state trade, 
and the bureaucratic argument. These arguments were, however, only 
systematically brought forward by the cameralists in the Austrian Monarchy, in 
particular by Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771). This can be explained 
by the fact that in the course of the eighteenth century, the Silesian Wars with 
Prussia laid bare the weakness of the Austrian Empire, showing the absolute 
necessity to reform the administration of the various parts of this Monarchy. Even 
in this case, complete legal unity was not the aim. In France and the Netherlands, 
 
18  J.J. Rousseau, Oeuvres Complètes III (Dijon 1970), 244. 
19  Y. Lequette, “Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de M. von Bar” 
in: Recueil Le Dalloz 178/28 (2002), 2202–2214. J. Carbonnier, “Le code civil” in: P. Nora (ed.), 
Les Lieux de mémoires II.2: La nation. Le territoire, l’état, le patrimoine (Paris 1986), 293–315 (309). 
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where revolutions had occurred, the constitutional argument was the predominant 
one. It is no coincidence, therefore, that only in these two countries a uniform 
codification was brought about that established legal unity throughout the country. 
The conclusion must be that these two uniform codifications were not in the first 
place practical assets, making things better for litigants or facilitating intra–state 
trade, but constitutional tools aimed at forging the political identity of “new 
nations”.20 
 
3. The reasoning of academics in favour of a European civil code 
It is interesting to note that the juridical argument is not strongly represented in the 
reasoning of the academics in favour of a European civil code mentioned above in 
the introduction. Only Kerameus favours a European codification solely for juridical 
reasons.21 Such a codification would bring a “unification, renovation and, why not, 
simplification of European civil law”. Kerameus argues that this is vital, since 
“today’s multitude of coexisting and overlapping legal rules within the European 
Union is, partly, an unnecessary and artificial source of confusion and 
uncertainty”.22 He concludes that “in a world of transcendent uniformity in areas 
such as means of communication (…), an appropriate degree of legal uniformity 
would only be adequate and, probably, welcome by lawyers and non–lawyers 
alike.” Interestingly, he limits his proposal for the time being to a “partial 
unification”, which can be explained by the fact that he does not use arguments of a 
political nature. 
 
Some of the other academics also invoke the juridical argument, but only in 
addition to other arguments. Schwintowski, for example, states at the very end of 
his paper that “people should be able to take this code and, having read it, know 
what to do and not to do”.23 It is also argued that individual citizens will benefit 
 
20  M. Van Hoecke, “L’idéologie d’un code civil européen” in: A. Wijffels (ed.), Le Code Napoléon, 
un ancêtre vénéré? Mélanges offerts à Jacques Vanderlinden (Brussels 2004), 467–494 (468–469), 
and A. Wijffels, “A new software–package for an outdated operating system?” in: M. Van 
Hoecke/I. Ost (eds.), The harmonisation of European private law (Oxford 2000), 101–116 (114), 
also conclude that codifications of private law were essential instruments in forging identity 
and political unity in the European nation states. 
21  K.D. Kerameus, “Problems of drafting a European civil code” in: European Review of Private 
Law 5 (1997), 475–481 (480–481). Kerameus (1937) was professor of civil procedure at the 
Athens University Law School and president of the International Academy of Comparative 
Law. 
22  Kerameus, “Problems”, 480. It is widely acknowledged that the piecemeal private law 
legislation issued by the European Union results in inconsistencies and confusion. Cf. V. 
Zeno–Zencovich, “The “European Civil Code”, European legal traditions and neo–
positivism” in: European Review of Private Law 4 (1998), 349–362 (354). U. Drobnig, 
“Europäisches Zivilgesetzbuch – Gründe und Grundgedanken” in: D. Martiny/N. Witzleb 
(eds.), Auf dem Wege zu einem Europäischen Zivilgesetzbuch (Berlin 1999), 109–123 (118–119). 
23  H.–P. Schwintowski, “The European civil code: A framework code only” in: S. 
Grundmann/J. Stuyck (eds.), An academic green paper on European contract law (Deventer 2002), 
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from a European civil code because it will offer better, more progressive law. Von 
Bar, for example, states that “many of our own national private law systems are 
hopelessly outdated”.24 Banakas writes that “the citizens of Europe will probably be 
happy with a change in their civil law to the better”.25 According to Banakas and 
Hesselink, the new European private law must, therefore, be “forward looking” and 
bring “progress”.26 Even though, however, the juridical argument is obviously 
present, it should be noted that an explicit argument that a European civil code will 
reduce the costs of litigation for ordinary citizens is lacking. This is hardly 
surprising. The juridical argument is historically connected to codification per se, not 
necessarily to a unifying codification. Since most European countries already have 
codified legal systems, the advantage for the majority of litigants will be limited in 
this respect. On the contrary, a uniform European civil code could easily lead to 
more expensive lawsuits, as a result of, for example, the necessity of translations 
and the distance to a new Supreme Court. 
 
The first practical political argument as used by the mercantilists, the argument that 
the state benefits from a codification because of a reduction of lawsuits seems also 
to be absent. Again, this is easy to understand. After all, this argument is closely 
connected to the juridical argument, which for reasons explained above was not 
strongly brought forward by the academics. The second argument of a practical 
political nature, concerning the promotion of intra–community trade, seems at first 
sight to be an important part of the case made by the scholars. This makes sense, 
since this argument is historically mostly used to underpin the introduction of a 
uniform codification. Indeed, there is no doubt that according to most academics a 
uniform European civil code is necessary in order to further the trade between the 
Member States.27 The argument of Lando may serve as an example: “The existing 
 
235–248 (246–247). Schwintowski (1947) holds the chair of private law, mercantile law, 
economic law and European law at the Humboldt University of Berlin. 
24  C. von Bar, “A Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law” in: Electronic Journal 
of Comparative Law 12/1 (May 2008), 2. Von Bar is professor of private law, European private 
law, international private law and comparative law at the University of Osnabrück. He is co–
founder of the European Law Institute and leads, since 1999, the Studygroup on a European 
Civil Code. Since 2010, he is special advisor to the commissioner for justice of the European 
Commission. 
25  Banakas, “European tort law”, 367. Banakas is a reader in law at the University of East Anglia 
(UK) and regularly represents the UK in European working groups on the harmonisation of 
European tort law. Cf. also Drobnig, “Europäisches Zivilgesetzbuch”, 120. 
26  Banakas, “European tort law”, 372. M.W. Hesselink, The new European private law. Essays on 
the future of private law in Europe (The Hague/London/New York 2002), 8. Hesselink (1968) is 
professor of European private law at the University of Amsterdam and a member of the 
Studygroup on a European Civil Code. Cf. also Lando/Beale, The Principles, xvi. 
27  Lando/Beale, The Principles, xv. C. von Bar, “From principles to codification: prospects for 
European private law” in: Columbia Journal of European Law 8 (2002), 379–387 (385). J. 
Basedow, “A common contract law for a Common Market” in: Common Market Law Review 33 
(1996), 1169–1195 (1172 and 1181–1182). Basedow, “Codification of private law”, 41. F. Blase, 
“A uniform European law of contracts – Why and how?” in: Columbia Journal of European Law 
8 (2002), 487–491 (490). Drobnig, “Europäisches Zivilgesetzbuch”, 116–117. 
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variety of contract laws in Europe may be regarded as a non–tariff barrier to the 
trade. It is the aim of the Union to do away with restrictions of trade within the 
Communities, and therefore the differences of law which restrict this trade should 
be abolished”.28 Lando does not argue, however, that the Union as a governmental 
entity will benefit from an increase in trade by means of growing revenues. He 
presents the introduction of a European civil code as a legal consequence of the 
Treaties, which discharges him from the obligation to specify why furthering trade 
is considered so important. Basedow is a little more specific, by describing the aim 
of the Union in this context as “promoting welfare”, but there, too, any reference to 
the interest of the government of the Union is lacking.29 Moreover, the trade 
argument is usually not fleshed out. Drobnig, for example, simply states: “Ein 
einheitlicher Markt bedarf fuer sein optimales Funktionieren eines einheitlichen 
privatrechts. Das zeigt bereits die geschichtliche Erfahrung gerade auch in 
Deutschland.”30 This is at least remarkable in light of the many papers questioning 
the economic necessity of a European civil code.31 It should be emphasised, 
however, that furthering trade is hardly ever the only argument for those who 
support the case of a European codification. 
Historically, the juridical and practical political arguments were not conclusive in 
bringing about the unifying codifications of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Today, these arguments seem to carry even less weight, at least in the 
reasoning of scholars. The constitutional argument, however, seems to be as 
dominant in the present debate on codification as it was 200 years ago, especially 
since 1992.32 Interestingly, many present–day academics favouring a European 
codification acknowledge this constitutional function of the codifications of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and make it a part of their argumentation.33 A 
fine example of this is provided by Collins, where he writes: 
 
28  O. Lando, “European Contract Law after the year 2000” in: Common Market Law Review 35 
(1998), 821–831 (821). Lando (1922) is professor emeritus at Copenhagen Business School and 
has been chairman of the Commission on European Contract Law for over twenty years. 
29  Basedow, “A common contract law”, 1184. Basedow (1949) is director of the Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (Hamburg). 
30  Drobnig, “Europäisches Zivilgesetzbuch”, 116. Drobnig (1928) is emeritus director and 
scientific member of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law 
(Hamburg). Cf. also Basedow, “A common contract law”, 1172. 
31  H. Wagner, “Economic ananlysis of cross–border legal uncertainty” in: J.M. Smits (ed.), The 
need for a European contract law. Diversity of contract law and the European internal market 
(Groningen 2005), 25–51. Cf. also Van Hoecke, “L’idéologie d’un code civil européen” 481. 
32  Cf. also Wilhelmsson, “Private law in the EU”, 89–90, and Van Hoecke, “L’idéologie d’un 
code civil européen”, 481. 
33  S. Rodotà, ‘The civil code within the European “constitutional process”’ in: M.W. Hesselink 
(ed.), The politics of a European civil code (The Hague 2006), 115–124 (118). M.W. Hesselink, 
“The politics of a European civil code” in: Hesselink (ed.), The politics of a European civil code, 
143–170 (153). J. Basedow, “Codification of private law in the European Union: the making of 
a hybrid” in: European Review of Private Law 9 (2001), 35–49 (41). E.K. Banakas, “European tort 
law: is it possible?” in: European Review of Private Law 3 (2002), 363–375 (364). R. 
Zimmermann, “Civil code and civil law. The “Europeanization” of private law within the 
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‘Historically, in nation states, civil law provided the bedrock on which political 
associations and institutions were constructed. The evolving rules of ownership, trade 
and personal status contained in private law described the structure and scope of a 
community. (…) Reliance on the rules implies a common identity and membership in a 
community. Without such an implicit common identity and membership, it seems 
impossible to imagine a single polity, an association of all peoples of Europe’.34 
Most of the other scholars also emphasise that a European civil code is necessary in 
order to create a European political community. Banakas, for example, writes that 
“a political ground for the harmonization of European civil law can be found in the 
quest for a common European citizen’s identity”.35 Alpa is also very explicit in this 
regard, stating that “if it is true that the legal component – that is the entire 
organization of law in a community constitutes an essential characteristic of that 
community – the drafting of a unitary code at a European dimension will become 
one of the aggregate factors in cementing that same European Community, and a 
factor in defining the collective European identity”.36 He believes that “each one of 
us (…) by studying, interpreting and applying the unified Civil Code will be and 
feel more European”.37 Zimmermann writes that “the political will exists to advance 
the process of European integration on an economic, political and cultural level; and 
it appears to be perfectly appropriate to facilitate this process by striving towards 
legal unity”.38 It should be noted that according to Zimmermann, a European 
codification does not lie around the corner. He seems to follow Savigny, arguing 
that “European legal unification is in the first place a task for legal scholarship, (…), 
and in doing so may or may not level the ground for unificatory legislation”.39 
Blase, too, emphasises the higher constitutional goal of a uniform codification. 
Interestingly, he does so with an eye on the position of Europe in the world at large. 
He argues that “with legal unification, legal professionals hold an important key to 
 
European Community and the re–emergence of a European legal science” in: Columbia Journal 
of European Law 1 (1995), 63–105 (73). 
34  H. Collins, The European civil code. The way forward (Cambridge 2008), 6. Collins (1953) holds 
the chair of English Law at the London School of Economics. He is co–founder of the Society 
for European Contract Law (SECOLA.org). 
35  Banakas, “European tort law”, 366. See also Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 385; 
Basedow, “Codification of private law”, 41 (“European identity might very well be furthered 
by a code”) and J. Basedow, “The case for a European contract act” in: Grundmann/Stuyck 
(eds.), An academic green paper, 147–157 (154). G. Gandolfi, “Un code Européen des contrats: 
pourquoi et comment” in: Grundmann/Stuyck (eds.), An academic green paper, 193–205 (205). 
36  G. Alpa, ‘European Community resolutions and the codification of “private law”’ in: 
European Review of Private Law 2 (2000), 321–333 (333). Alpa (1947) is professor of law at the 
Sapienza University of Rome. 
37  Alpa, “European Community resolutions”, 333. 
38  Zimmermann, “Civil code and civil law”, 73. 
39  Zimmermann, “Roman law and European legal unity” in: A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds.), Towards 
a European civil code (Nijmegen 1998 (2nd edition)), 21–39 (39). 
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a truly unified Europe”, and explains that this would place Europe on the map, 
internationally: “We would also show our independence from North America”.40 
 
Some academics realise that creating a European identy is quite difficult, given the 
differences in language and culture, and consider a common civil code as one of the 
few options to achieve that identity. Schwintowski, explicitly referring to the 
difference between the European Union and the USA in this respect, argues that 
“because Europeans are finding it so difficult to develop and feel something of a 
European identity, it is up to the Member States of the Community to take 
advantage of this unique opportunity and do what already so often brought peace 
and unity to individual nations: create a common, a European code of civil law”. 41 
In line with this, the European civil code is often presented as the “real constitution” 
of Europe. Mattei, for example, argues that “because economy is not disconnected 
from culture, ideology and society, this is a constitutional moment”, concluding that 
the European civil code will be the (economic) constitution of Europe.42 Rodotà 
agrees with this, with an explicit reference to the historical role of codifications. He 
thinks that, as in the past, “civil codes should play an essential role in the 
development of the new Europe, representing the real constitution of civil 
society”.43 Collins, finally, comes to the same conclusion: “A Civil Code provides a 
vital ingredient in constructing an economic and social constitution for Europe. In 
the long run, in order to build greater solidarity among the peoples of Europe, it is 
this social and economic constitution that must be constructed”.44 
 
4. Constitutive rhetoric and the debate on a European civil code 
Since the main argument of the scholars in favour of a European civil code is of a 
constitutional nature, it is likely to encounter a specific type of reasoning in their 
papers, described above as constitutive rhetoric. In this section, the nature of the 
reasoning of the scholars will be discussed, distinguishing three characteristic 
features of constitutive rhetoric. Firstly, the style and the language used by the 
academics will be analysed. Constitutive rhetoric is about creating a (political) 
entity, so it is important, for example, to use the opposing pair of words “we” and 
“they”. Secondly, the presence of narratives will be investigated. In the context of 
creating a political community by means of constitutive rhetoric, a narrative is 
essential. After all, if a community has a history, it obviously exists. Finally, the way 
 
40  Blase, “A uniform European law of contracts”, 490. Blase is a lawyer. 
41  Schwintowski, “The European Civil Code”, 243–244. 
42  U. Mattei, “Hard minimal code now – A critique of “softness” and a plea for responsibility in 
the European debate over codification” in: Grundmann/Stuyck (eds.), An academic green 
paper, 215–233 (233). Mattei (1961) is professor of private law at the University of Turin (Italy) 
and general editor of the series Common Core of European Private Law (Trento Project). 
43  Rodotà, “The civil code”, 118. Rodotà (1933) is emeritus professor of private law at the 
Sapienza University of Rome. He was member of the European Parliament (1987) and of the 
Convention for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). 
44  Collins, The European civil code, 4. Cf. also idem, 94 and 101–103. 
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in which arguments of opponents of a European codification, usually implying 
practical obstacles with regard to the feasibility of the project, are dealt with will be 
investigated. Since the introduction of a uniform codification on a European level is 
primarily meant as an instrument to constitute the new political entity, it is likely 
that these arguments are not taken at face value, but treated from the same 
constitutional perspective. 
 
4.1. Style and language 
The academics clearly use the terms “we” and “they” frequently, obviously meant 
to create a group with a “European identity”. Von Bar, for example, states that “they 
oppose it, they accuse us of”, thus suggesting that there is a struggle going on.45 
Elsewhere he writes “let us build a new common law for our old continent”.46 
Banakas even employs terminology associated with war: “academics are drafted to 
the political task” of preparing a civil code.47 This struggle is, of course, not about 
the civil code itself, but about the future of Europe. Hesselink, for example, 
emphasises that there is a battle at hand “between Euro–sceptics and 
intergovernmentalists, on the one hand, and federalists on the other”, assigning 
himself to the latter group. The war–metaphor has the advantage of creating a sense 
of urgency, thus implying an exhortation to join the group and eventually to act. 
This sense of urgency is made explicit by, for example, Banakas, stating that “it is a 
well–known mantra that European unity must constantly evolve or perish”.48 
 
In this battle, those favouring a European civil code are positively labelled 
“modern”, with the implicit label for the opponents of “old–fashioned” or 
“backward”.49 This is usually an effective distinction, because most people would 
like to be “modern”. A very popular distinction is “national” versus “post–
national”, which makes it possible to associate the opponents with “nationalism”, a 
very negative label indeed.50 Hesselink does so indirectly by positively describing 
the “federalists”, as a result of which “we” and “they” trade places. Federalists, he 
writes, “are more optimistic with regard to the Europeanization of private law. 
They dismiss the culturalist position as being essentially nationalist. They have a 
dream in which (part of) private law should be post–national. And they are strongly 
committed to the ideal of European unity, and look upon the new nationalism with 
great suspicion”.51 Basedow is less subtle. He criticises the universities, because 
 
45  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 379. 
46  C. von Bar, “Paving the way forward with principles of European private law” in: 
Grundmann/Stuyck (eds.), An academic green paper, 137–145 (145). Cf. also ibidem, 137. 
47  Banakas, “European tort law”, 367. 
48  Banakas, “European tort law”, 367. Cf. also Hesselink, “The politics of a European civil code”, 
148, who concludes that in this battle the Euro–sceptics “seem to have won the day”. 
49  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 379. 
50  Collins, for example, makes abundant use of the concept of the European Union as a “post–
nationalist” politicial entity. Collins, The European civil code, 13, 16, 20 and 23. 
51  Hesselink, “The politics of a European civil code”, 148. 
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students of law “learn the false lesson that the essence of law is national”.52 As a 
result, they are “marked by a nationalism which is unknown in other sectors of 
higher education”. He subsequently states that “this anti–European effect of the 
teaching of law seems utterly unacceptable”. Since nobody wants to be affiliated 
with “old–fashioned”, “intellectually unsound” or “nationalistic”, this language 
strongly invites the audience to join the pro–European civil code group. 
Consequently, those who question the feasibility of the project will feel the need to 
emphasise that they are not “anti–European”.53 
 
The idea of constitutive rhetoric is that the audience joins the group as a result of a 
strong “we” versus “they” distinction. It should be realised, however, that the use 
of terminology as explicit as just described can be counterproductive. Some terms 
that are meant to enforce the (political) entity, can easily have the opposite effect. 
Some words, such as “European constitution”, can be useful to take a community of 
states to a higher level of integration, but probably precisely for that reason also 
carry the danger of estranging a part of the audience. Choosing and using concepts 
is obviously a matter of trial and error, testing the grounds of affiliation. Explicit 
terminology is, therefore, more often than not mitigated by simultaneously 
employing mystifying concepts. It is no coincidence that the European Commission 
refers to the work of the academics on a European private law as a “Common 
Frame of Reference” or a “non–sector–specific legislative device”, not as a 
“codification”. 54 Von Bar is aware of the negative effect the word “civil code” can 
have on an audience. He writes that “it would not be desirable for the very notion of 
a European Civil Code to become an emotive term whose use must always be 
moderated with extreme care to suit the particular readership in question”.55 He 
sometimes even argues that the term “civil code” should be avoided altogether, 
because “it raises emotions and fears which for the time being are impossible to 
overcome”.56 
 
The word “codification” cannot be completely omitted, however, because of its 
function in the context of constitutive rhetoric. Von Bar is aware of this. He confirms 
that the term CFR “has the charm of the unknown and, at least on the face of it, the 
politically innocent”, but at the same time describes the toolbox function of the CFR 
as a “synonym for a first class funeral”. It is, therefore, not surprising that he keeps 
using the term “code”, but tries to play down its significance. While addressing an 
English audience on the subject, he tells them not to “be worried by the words “civil 
code”. We have merely adopted the terminology of the European Parliament (…). 
But what is a code? In the foreseeable future at least we do not mean a continental–
 
52  Basedow, “The case for a European contract act”, 153. 
53  Zwalve, “Een “Common Frame of Reference”, 192: “Men mag dergelijke gedachten niet als 
anti–Europees bestempelen; dat standpunt zij verre van mij”. 
54  Cf. Zwalve, “Een “Common Frame of Reference”, 191. 
55  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 385. 
56  C. von Bar, “A Common Frame of Reference for European private law – Academic efforts and 
political realities” in: Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 23 (2008), 37–49 (40). 
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type comprehensive civil law”.57 It should be noted that Von Bar in turn tries to 
mitigate this statement by using the proviso “in the foreseeable future”. Such 
provisos are common coinage in constitutive rhetoric, because it is possible to make 
a point or use a concept, whereas at the same time the urgency for a possible 
opponent to react is defused. Finally, the explosive connotation of the concept of a 
“European civil code”, due to its relationship to the process of nation building, can 
also be defused by introducing a distinction. Von Bar, for example, distinguishes 
two different modes of a European civil code: a “legislative act of the conventional 
type for the purpose of crowning the birth of a state” and “an intellectually sound 
model with the potential (…) to grow in legal authority and binding force”.58 Who 
will be able to resist an “intellectually sound model”? 
 
Some scholars, however, grow weary of this paradox, which consists in 
simultaneously affirming and denying that the final purpose is a European civil 
code. Collins, for example, pierces the terminological veil created by the 
Commission by referring to the CFR as “a code that denies that it is a code”, or “a 
code that dares not speak its name”.59 Hesselink, too, bluntly states that to his 
understanding there is no doubt that the Commission aims to achieve a European 
civil code, because it “decided to allocate the task of drafting the CFR to a Network 
led by a group called the Study Group on a European Civil Code”.60 They obviously 
believe that repeatedly using the concept of “codification” is necessary to bring it 
about in the long run. 
 
Finally, the use of words such as “necessary”, “logically” and “inevitably” is 
significant. In this way, a European civil code is presented as the necessary outcome 
of previous conduct, decisions or accepted ideals and, thus, as a fait accompli. 
Banakas offers a clear example of this where he writes that “the equal treatment of 
all European nationals in the geographical area of the Union necessitates 
harmonization of national liability regimes”.61 “Universal Human rights”, he 
argues, “can be seen as inevitably leading to uniform civil rights”. Von Bar states 
that “European jurists sense that matters cannot stay as they are”.62 After all, “that 
diverse private law hampers the internal market is an everyday experience, whether 
that admits of empirical representation or not.” It is, therefore, not “transparent 
how, in the long term, the European Union should operate with presumably (sic) 
 
57  C. von Bar, “A new Jus Commune Europeaum and the importance of the common law” in: 
B.S Markesinis (ed.), The Clifford Chance Millennium Lectures on the coming together of the 
common law and the civil law (Oxford 2000), 67–79 (78). 
58  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 280. 
59  Collins, The European civil code, 77 and 86. 
60  Hesselink, “The politics of a European civil code”, 160. Cf. also the description of the 
Common Frame of Reference by B. Lurger, “The Common Frame of Reference/Optional 
Code and the various understandings of social justice in Europe” in: T. Wilhelmsson/E. 
Paunio/A. Pohjolainen (eds.), Private law and the many cultures of Europe (The Hague 2007), 
177–199 (180–181). Lurger is a member of the Studygroup for a European Contract Code. 
61  Banakas, “European tort law”, 366. 
62  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 385. 
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much more than 20 different regimes of private law.” Schwintowski, provides 
another example, by arguing that “the true logic of harmonisation entails not only 
safeguarding what has been achieved at the end of a long discussion process among 
the Member States of the European Union, but also presenting it to the citizens of 
Europe in a new quality and in a manner which for the first time, also shows that 
Europe’s community of law exists not only in the minds of Brussels bureaucrats but 
also as a code which is truly meaningful for every individual in the world’s largest 
economic entity”.63 
 
Hesselink, too, writes that a European civil code is inevitable. He admits that there 
is a lot of vagueness in the communications of the Commission, but he nonetheless 
expresses the conviction that “a code it will be”.64 Interestingly, there seems to be an 
inconsistency in the paper of Hesselink, because some pages further he accepts that 
the Action Plan of the Commission might not lead to a codification. He warns his 
public that such a failure, 
 
‘will be highly symbolic as well. When it comes to subjects that directly affect the 
everyday life of citizens, Europe is hopelessly divided, critics would probably say. This 
would add to the skepticism concerning the difficulty Europe had in reaching an 
agreement on a constitutional treaty and the subsequent rejection of it by the majority 
of the French and Dutch populations’.65 
Such “inconsistencies” are, however, in fact paradoxes because they are closely 
connected to the purpose of constitutive rhetoric. Codification is presented as the 
necessary outcome of a process, in order to convince the audience to join the group 
of supporters. By doing so, however, there is always the risk that the audience does 
not see the necessity to act, since a codification will be arrived at anyhow. It is, 
therefore, more effective to create simultaneously a sense of urgency by suggesting 
the possibility of a crisis. 
 
Schintowski provides another fine example of such a paradox, combining the fait 
accompli reasoning with a sense of crisis. He starts his paper by arguing that 
“Europe is moving towards a European Civil Code” and that “European contract 
law already exists”. He continues by stating that “it would be absurd for Europe to 
stop in its tracks and abandon the project of actually realising the harmonisation 
idea in the form of a common European Civil Code. This would be tantamount to 
throwing away everything that harmonisation has achieved so far and that has long 
since become reality in the Member States”.66 At the end of the paper, however, he 
creates a sense of crisis, by concluding that “all this shows how urgently Europe 
needs symbols that will create a sense of community. A European Civil Code would 
thus be a superb opportunity to give the European idea another visible and 
 
63  Schwintowski, “The European Civil Code”, 243–244. 
64  Hesselink, “The politics of a European civil code”, 143. Cf. also ibidem, 160. 
65  Hesselink, “The politics of a European civil code”, 154. 
66  Schwintowski, “The European Civil Code”, 243. 
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Narratives are also likely elements of constitutive rhetoric. A narrative allows for 
historical identification, because it suggests continuity. It presents a subject as 
existing prior to the moment of the action in the narrative itself. The purpose of this 
in the context of constitutive rhetoric is to bring the audience more easily to the 
cause, by convincing them that the cause is almost predestined. The suggestion is 
that there is very little still to decide.68 In this respect, there is a strong resemblance 
with the use of words related to the argument of succession, as discussed above. 
Von Bar, for example, endorses the narrative in which the Empire of Charlemagne is 
presented as the predecessor of present–day Europe, by reiterating a statement of 
Jacques Delors, made in 1992: “Charlemagne nous rappelle que l’Europe est plus 
ancienne que les états qui la composent. Avec notre communauté, nous 
redécouvrons l’Europe dans sa totalité”.69 Particularly remarkable here is the use of 
the words “nous redecouvrons”, because it suggests a prior existence. In the same 
way, Von Bar suggests the pre–existence of a European private law, by referring to 
countries “which think they need more time to accommodate to a renewed jus 
commune europaeum”.70 Hesselink seems to endorse this narrative, by referring to the 
work on a European civil code as a “(re–)Europeanization of private law”.71 
Reinhard Zimmermann, finally, also gives some support to the narrative, where he 
describes the role of legal science in the process of legal unification: “In carving out 
their common systematic, conceptual and ideological foundations which are hidden 
under the debris piled up in the course of the legal particularization over the last 
two hundred years”.72 
 
As has been explained earlier, constitutive rhetoric is prone to create paradoxes and 
the narratives are no exception to this. The narrative of Von Bar about a “jus 
commune europaeum” can serve as an example. Von Bar suggests with this narrative 
the pre–existence of a European private law. In another paper, however, he negates 
the availability of such a common ground. There, he argues that “Europe also needs 
a “single currency” in law, a further symbol of its cohesion, not least with one eye 
 
67  Schwintowski, “The European Civil Code”, 246. 
68  Cf. Perelman/Olbrechts–Tyteca, The new rhetoric, chapter 2: “Arguments based on the 
structure of reality”. 
69  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 379 (footnote). 
70  Von Bar, “Paving the way forward”, 143. Cf. also Basedow, “A common contract law”, 1170, 
and Schwintowski “The European Civil Code”, 246. 
71  Hesselink, “The politics of a European civil code”, 150. Cf. also Walter Hallstein (1901–1982), 
member of the first European Commission, as early as 1964: “die verloren geglaubte Einheit 
des europäischen Wesens tritt wieder ans Licht”. W. Hallstein, “Angleichung des Privat– und 
Prozessrechts in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft” in: Rabelszeitschrift 28 (1964), 
211–231 (230). 
72  Zimmermann, “Roman law and European legal unity”, 38. 
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on its growing role in the world.”73 In order to support this need for a European 
codification he compares Europe to the United States, explaining that the situation 
there is entirely different, as “a single language prevails and it has been possible to 
build on a predominantly shared legal tradition.”74 Again, this paradox is functional 
because, on the one hand, the audience is told that a European codification does not 
constitute a radical departure from history, whilst on the other it must be made 
clear that action is required. 
 
Obviously, a narrative need not be flawless, it probably seldomly is, as long as it is 
able to serve its purpose: creating a community. If it turns out that the narrative 
does not serve its purpose anymore, it can easily be adapted or even traded in for 
another narrative. After all, a narrative does not operate as an indispensable 
argument. If the Greeks are not completely taken in by the narrative of a European 
Empire in which Charlemagne figures prominently because they were not part of 
that Empire, one could decide to look for another, more encompassing story. With 
regard to the narrative of a “jus commune europaeum”, for example, Wijffels 
emphasises the fact that during the Ancien Régime, the local iura propria (statutes or 
customs) always prevailed over this “european common law”, which only enjoyed 
subsidiary force.75 In fact, each territory had developed its own version of the ius 
commune. Alpa seems to realise this and, therefore, replaces this narrative by 
another one based on the “common legal values that have consolidated in Western 
Europe”.76 According to him, there are in all countries of the European Union 
“fundamental rights of an identical nature”.77 
 
The narrative can even be incorrect, as the founding myth provided by Hesselink 
concerning the early days of the process of the Europeanisation of private law 
shows.78 Using the typical beginning of a fairy tale, he informs his audience that “in 
the beginning, the Europeanization of private law was quite romantic” and that 
“nobody remembers exactly when it started”. He subsequently argues that “it was 
characterized by harmony and openness”, and that “it was an exciting academic 
exercise”. He, thus, emphasises the innocence of the activities of the academics by 
stressing that it was not political. As late as 2001, he argues, the Commission 
stepped in and the process became politicised. It is easy to demonstrate that the 
facts on which the narrative by Hesselink is founded are slightly different.79 
European officials such as Hauschild have been involved from the start and the 
 
73  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 385. 
74  Von Bar, “From principles to codification”, 385. 
75  Wijffels, “A new software–package”, 114. Cf. also E. Descheemaeker, “Faut–il codifier le droit 
privé européen des contrats?” in: McGill Law Journal 47 (2002), 791–853 (825). 
76  Alpa, “European Community resolutions”, 328. Cf. also Schwintowski, “The European Civil 
Code”, 247. 
77  Alpa, “European Community resolutions”, 328. 
78  Hesselink, “The politics of a European civil code”, 154–155. 
79  A slightly different version of this narrative can also be found at Von Bar, “A Common Frame 
of Reference”, 41 and 43, and at Zeno–Zencovich, “The “European Civil Code”, 353–354. 
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issue of codification was already dealt with in the European Parliament as early as 
1989.80 In addition, a close connection always existed between the academics and 
Community institutions involved. Lando, a good acquaintance of the Director 
General of the legal services of the Commission in the 1980s, Claus Ehlermann, 
makes no secret of the fact that his group was already funded by the then EC in that 
period.81 Since this narrative is not essential to the reasoning in favour of a 
European codification as such, however, the strained relationship to the facts is 
immaterial. 
 
4.3. The role of arguments in a discourse of constitutive rhetoric 
As has been shown above, most academics in support of the introduction of a 
European civil code emphasise the constitutional argument. They favour a 
European codification of private law not so much because it could provide better 
law for litigants, or because it could enhance the taxability of citizens by reducing 
the length and number of lawsuits, but because it could contribute to the project of a 
politically unified Europe by strengthening a common identity. This conclusion has 
serious consequences for the role arguments play in the debate on the desirability 
and feasibility of such a European code. Given the overriding importance of the 
political goal, the specific arguments dealing with the advantages and 
disadvantages of the codification project itself will be of less relevance to these 
scholars. Since in their view a European code is a logical corollary of the process of 
political integration, the reasoning itself will become part of the constitutive 
rhetoric. This is true for the treatment by the scholars not only of the arguments in 
favour of a European civil code, but of the arguments brought forward against such 
a code as well. 
 
It has already been shown that paradoxes are part and parcel of constitutive rhetoric 
and the use of arguments in favour of a European civil code are no exception to this. 
Even the main argument in favour of a European civil code, the constitutional 
argument, does not escape the paradoxical nature of constitutive rhetoric. This 
argument is often presented in the context of overcoming “nationalism”, by creating 
a distinction between opponents being “nationalistic” and those favouring 
European integration as “post–nationalists”. This serves, of course, the purpose of 
encompassing the audience, because nobody wants to be associated with 
“nationalism”. However, the distinction results in a paradox, because a closer look 
at the reasoning of the academics clearly indicates that in fact they are themselves 
 
80  See for the involvement of Hallstein, member of the first European Commission, above 
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involved in a process of nation building on a European level.82 Their emphasis on 
the need for symbols, for example, seems to be a reflection of the efforts on an 
institutional level to create more coherence in the Union by introducing a hymn and 
a flag, both typical instruments of nineteenth–century nation building. 83 The 
references made by many scholars favouring a European civil code to the 
codifications of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also confirm that there is at 
least a parallel with nation building on a European level.84 Wilhelmsson describes 
this tension within the argumentation in favour of a uniform civil code, arguing that 
the idea of a unified legal system is connected to the idea of a unified state and that 
such an idea might be at odds with the much used concept of the European Union 
as a “Post–Modern State”.85 
 
Interestingly, Collins seems to recognise the paradox and feels obliged to solve it by 
yet another distinction. Early in his book, he praises the historical role of “civil law” 
in forging a “common identity.”86 Later on, he tries to avoid the nationalistic 
connotation of the codifications of the nineteenth century by making a distinction 
between these codifications and the project for a European civil code. Collins argues 
that “We must reject as a model the nineteenth–century codes of the nation states of 
Europe. Those symbols of nationalism and centralized authority, with the ambition 
of comprehensive and detailed regulation of civil society, are inappropriate for the 
multi–level governance system of the European Union”.87 He proposes a different 
kind of codification, namely “a principle–based regulation at the European Union 
level (…) leaving the national legal systems scope for tailoring rules to work 
effectively and efficiently with local customs, practices and functional needs.”88 
 
The problem with this distinction is twofold. Firstly, nineteenth–century 
codifications, such as the French Code civil (1804), the Dutch WNH 1809 and the 
Austrian ABGB (1811) did not really consist of “detailed regulations”. On the 
contrary, they contained relatively abstract provisions, precisely because that is the 
best way to encompass various different legal systems.89 This has everything to do 
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with the method of comparative law as aptly described by Zweigert and Kötz, and 
explains why the result of the Lando–group bears the title “Principles of European 
Contract Law”.90 A European codification based on principles, as proposed by 
Collins is, therefore, perfectly in line with its historical predecessors. Secondly, the 
scope for “local customs, practices and functional needs” will probably not differ 
very much from the leeway in this respect left by the nineteenth–century 
codifications. After all, one of the reasons why Collins proposes to replace the 
present system of mutual recognition is, that “mutual recognition affirms the need 
to respect the diversity and integrity of nations”.91 In view of these two problems, it 
becomes clear that the distinction is not real and predominantly functions in the 
context of constitutive rhetoric. It makes it possible to contribute to the process of 
nation building on a European level, and at the same time apply the negative label 
of “nationalism” to those critical of this process. 
 
Other arguments used by those academics in favour of a European civil code will 
not primarily be used due to their merits, but in order to support the constitutional 
argument. As stated earlier, Schwintowsky favours a European civil code for 
predominantly constitutional reasons. In addition, he invokes the juridical 
argument, expressing the hope that the new codification will be “clear, simple and 
comprehensible for all Europeans”, so that people “know what to do and not to 
do”.92 He seems to be not completely consistent here, however, because he also 
argues that “the European Civil Code should avoid going into detail”. According to 
him, these “details and the actual implementation of the basic rules set out in the 
European Civil Code will be handled by each country’s national laws”.93 This is a 
wise proposal, since, as argued above, a “code of principles” is best suited to 
encompass various legal systems. Moreover, leaving detailed regulation to the 
Member States will facilitate the political acception of the new code. It is not quite 
clear, however, how such a hybrid legal system will be comprehensible to ordinary 
citizens. Nevertheless, focussing on such criticism would be missing the point. In 
the context of constitutive rhetoric, the argument has already served its purpose by 
referring to these citizens as “Europeans”. 
 
Von Bar also provides another example of the use of corollary arguments that have 
a function beyond the merits of the arguments themselves. Von Bar invokes the 
juridical argument, but continues by arguing that a new European civil code would 
also be beneficial to other countries outside Europe, probably China or Russia. He 
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writes that “Europe is the home continent of private law. We as a Union should 
have something on offer not only because so many of our own national private law 
systems are hopelessly outdated, but also because other parts of the world are 
looking at us as well and wondering whether we can convincingly contribute to 
their needs to modernize their private law systems”.94 It is, of course, questionable 
whether private law in Europe is really “hopelessly outdated”, or whether China is 
anxiously waiting for a European civil code. This is not important, however. The 
real function of this argument is not to be found in these concrete “merits”, but in 
the references to a collective identity, embodied in the words “Europe is the home 
continent of private law” and “we as a Union”. In this way, the argument is in fact a 
part of constitutive rhetoric, and becomes thus supportive of the constitutional 
argument. 
 
Finally, Von Bar also expresses the hope, connected with the drafting of a “Common 
Frame of Reference” that “for the first time for approximately 200 years students 
from all over Europe could be taught parts of the law in all European universities 
on the basis of an identical text. Whether they go to Uppsala, Edinburgh, Budapest 
or Amsterdam, they could be sure that for at least one or two terms they would 
study there exactly what they would have studied at home”.95 Again, questioning 
the relevance of studying abroad if there are no differences in the curriculum would 
be missing the point, because this is not a decisive argument, important for its 
concrete merits. It is above all a vehicle that allows making an (implicit) reference to 
the narrative of the ius commune and using the concept of “European universities”. 
 
Arguments in which the feasibility of a European civil code is questioned will, as a 
rule, also not primarily be dealt with on their merits by academics favouring such a 
code for constitutional reasons. This is quite understandable because these scholars 
have set their mind on using a European civil code to further the creation of a 
European polity. Since their project serves a higher purpose, they will hardly be 
impressed by objections of an ideological, legal or practical nature. Particularly the 
reactions to the ideological and legal objections are best understood when taken as a 
part of the constitutive rhetoric. 
 
The ideological objection is in fact the counterpart of the constitutional argument of 
those favouring such a code. In this objection, the legal diversity is presented as a 
fundamental aspect of Europe that must be preserved. It is argued that if the 
differences in legal cultures are erased, the essence of Europe will be lost. Scholars 
favouring a uniform European codification immediately incorporate this argument 
in their constitutive rhetoric. Von Bar, for example, simply returns the argument by 
stating that “it is culture that is at issue, for sure, but it is the culture of a truly 
European private law”.96 Hesselink makes the objection a part of his distinction 
 
94  Von Bar, “A Common Frame of Reference”, 38. 
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between nationalists and post–nationalists, by dismissing what he calls “the 
culturalist position” as “being essentially nationalist”.97 
 
The reactions to the legal objections also show the influence of constitutive rhetoric. 
Various writers question the competence of the European Community (now Union) 
to legislate comprehensively in the field of private law, and that the introduction of 
a European civil code is probably legally impossible.98 It is argued that a specific 
competence to codify private law is missing and that it not easy to use the internal 
market clause as a legal basis. In addition, it is sometimes held that activities in the 
field of codification are contrary to the principle of subsidiarity, implying that the 
Community can only take action if and in so far as because the “objections of the 
proposed action” cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States”. 99 It is 
argued that Member States are perfectly able to regulate their own legal systems 
without hampering the realisation of the goals of the Community. 
 
The appeal to the principle of subsidiarity is possibly easiest to deal with, since it is 
notoriously difficult to make this principle operational in a legal way.100 Basedow 
even solves the problem in a way that leaves no scope for the principle at all. He 
simply states that the objective of the Community is to introduce uniform laws and 
subsequently argues that “it is clear that a single Member State cannot bring about 
uniformity by its own laws and that this objective can much better be achieved by 
Community action.”101 The problem with this solution is that legal unity is not an 
objective per se, but a means to an end, for example to facilitate trade, or to prevent 
lawsuits between citizens. 
 
The objection that the European Union lacks the specific competence to introduce a 
comprehensive uniform civil code is approached by the academics favouring a 
European code for constitutional reasons in two different ways. Firstly, a kind of 
implied powers doctrine is used to extensively interpret the internal market clause. 
Schwintowksi, for example, states that “it would be the concept of the internal 
market itself that would constitute the basic legitimation of a future European Civil 
Code”.102 In his words, “Europe is above all a community of law”. 103 Basedow, 
admitting that the “cultural effect of a legal unification of European contract law” 
does not provide for a legal basis, argues that this should not prevent the 
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Commission from taking action. After all, the Commission has also the competence 
“to strengthen the confidence of citizens in the orderly operation of the internal 
market, i.e. measures which are designed to break down psychological barriers 
preventing the participation of individuals and undertakings in intra–community 
commerce”.104 Von Bar provides an interesting example of how far the concept of 
the “internal market” can be stretched. He expresses the hope that “even the 
distinction which we all make today between cross–border and purely domestic 
cases might well have disappeared for many purposes in a market that describes 
itself as a single internal market”.105 
 
This first response is still based on Treaty provisions, although these provisions are 
extensively interpreted in view of the higher purpose of creating a European 
political entity. In the second response to the competence issue, such legal reasoning 
is surpassed. A completely new source of legitimacy is exploited by asserting that 
the issue of codification has already been decided on a higher, constitutional level. 
In a kind of fait accompli–reasoning, so typical of (constitutive) rhetoric, it is argued 
that the EU already has entered a “constituent phase”, and that, therefore, a new 
source of legitimacy is already in place.106 The following argumentation of Rodotà 
may serve as another example. He states that “an explicit and formal European 
constituent process” has started in June 1990 when the European Council of 
Cologne established that the European Union needed a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.107 He subsequently argues that this “ongoing constituent process” is also 
relevant for the issue of codification. According to Rodotà, “We cannot discuss 
European codification by prevailingly looking at the past. This apparently realistic 
approach, risks creating a circumstance in contradiction with the new constitutional 
data.”108 The Common Frame of Reference as proposed by the Commission in the 
Action Plan (2003) is such a “circumstance” and for that reason rejected by Rodotà. 
He concludes that “the European constituent process cannot be amputated of the 
codification perspective.”109 
 
Rodotà’s reasoning, introducing a new source of legitimacy, makes it possible to 
bypass a strict legal approach to the competence issue. However, it is also 
noteworthy that the reasoning itself surpasses specific legal reasoning. After all, the 
declaration of the European Council in Cologne mentioned by Rodotà is not a 
binding document, probably because of its broad scope. Nonetheless, it is useful as 
a part of an argumentation based on constitutive rhetoric, precisely because of it 
broad scope. For the same reason, preambles can be more relevant than black letter 
lawyers tend to think, as the example of the US–Constitution shows. In constitutive 
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rhetoric, legal texts are not so much used because of their legal value, but for the 
references they make to the collective identity. For scholars in favour of a European 
civil code for constitutional reasons, it suffices, therefore, to refer to any type of 
instrument of an institution of the European Union, such as resolutions of the 
European Parliament or declarations of the European Council, regardless whether 
these texts are binding or not.110 Von Bar, for example, does not consider it a 
problem that his proposal to draft a set of principles encompassing all private law, 
not just contract law, “deviates a bit from the EU–Commission’s communication”, 
because “we feel that we not only have some important backing from the Tampere 
Summit (…). The European Parliament has in mind exactly the same scope of work 
to be done as we have”.111 Non–binding corollaries of European Treaties texts, such 
as preambles (“an ever closer union”) or protocols, can be used in the same way. 
 
This reference to the European Parliament is not a coincidence, because the new 
source of legitimacy is ultimately founded on the concept of a “European people” as 
the obvious subject of the “constituent phase”.112 This allows Banakas, for example, 
to almost grant the European Parliament the competence to decide on the issue of 
codification. According to him, “the EP has long ago asked for a European civil 
Code (…) undeterred by Governments or decisions of the European court. This is 
significant, as the Parliament (…) may be seen as representing the people of Europe 
better than any other European institution”.113 It is hardly surprising that the 
existence of this “European people” is presented here as a fact. Basedow endorses 
such empowerment of the European Parliament, stating that the community should 
accept the task of unification “in accordance with the resolutions of the European 
Parliament.”114 Tilmann even excludes the possibility that “das Europäische 
Parlament sich auf dem klarsichtig und eindeutig eingeschlagenen Weg beirren 
oder aufhalten läßt”.115 
 
Hesselink is also in favour of creating legitimacy for the draft of a European civil 
code by emphasising that “the democratically elected representatives of the 
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European citizens” should be “part of the drafting process”.116 He suggests 
submitting “fifty political questions on European contract law to the European 
Parliament and the other stakeholders”.117 He has less confidence in the present 
Parliament than Tilmann, however, and therefore resorts to the foundation of the 
new European political entity: the “European people”, or the “European citizens”. 
In his view, the European Commission should take the lead here: “The Commission 
should show more courage and make a real effort to include the European citizens 
in the political process towards a European civil code.”118 This route via direct 
democracy is, of course, a convenient way to bypass legal questions concerning 
competence. For that reason, Hesselinks list of “fifty political questions” also 
include the question whether the “European citizens” think such a European civil 
code should be enacted.119 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Academics have been discussing the desirability and feasibility of a European civil 
code of for over 35 years, and some of them have spent much time and energy 
working on drafts for such a code. In this debate, the advocates of a European code 
and their opponents do not operate on the same level of reasoning. Critics of the 
project focus on questions of a legal or practical nature, for example whether the 
European Union has the competence to enact a uniform civil code, whereas 
advocates of the project seem to have little patience with these kind of “problems”. 
This peculiar quality of the debate can be explained by analysing the nature of the 
arguments that are brought forward by the scholars that support the case for a 
uniform European civil code from a historical perspective, and by subsequently 
applying the theory of constitutive rhetoric in their argumentation. 
 
Historically, the two uniform codifications that were introduced around 1800, 
namely the French and Dutch civil codes (1804 and 1809), were not in the first place 
practical instruments, making things better for litigants or facilitating intra–state 
trade, but constitutional tools aimed at forging the political identity of “nations”. In 
other words, the constitutional argument was conclusive in bringing about these 
uniform civil codes, and not juridical or practical political arguments. The analysis 
in this paper shows that in the present debate, the constitutional argument is 
predominant as well. Most scholars favouring a uniform European civil code 
emphasise that this code is necessary in order to create a European political 
community. For that reason, it should come as no surpise that a specific reasoning, 
characteristic for constitutive rhetoric, can be found in their papers. 
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Three features of constitutive rhetoric stand out in particular. First, academics 
favouring a European civil code use a style and language that is suitable to create an 
audience, for example the distinction between “we” and “they”. This use is 
accompanied by a terminology that provides the newly created group with a 
positive identity, by labelling it as “modern” or “post–nationalist”, or creates a 
sense of urgency. Secondly, narratives are introduced to strengthen the collective 
identity of the audience. In accordance with the theory of constitutive rhetoric, 
paradoxes are part and parcel of these narratives, because in the narrative the prior 
existence of the audience to be created is already assumed. Lastly, it has turned out 
that both the other more practical arguments used by the scholars proposing a 
European civil code, and the reactions of these scholars to the arguments of their 
opponents should not be regarded as contributions to the debate on the desirability 
and feasibility of such a code itself, but as elements of the constitutive rhetoric. 
 
For that reason, miscommunication in the debate between the academics favouring 
a uniform European civil code for “constitutional reasons” and those critical of such 
a project for more practical reasons lies just around the corner. These opponents 
probably believe that they are involved in a discussion on the pros and cons of a 
uniform European civil code itself and might conclude, for example because it has 
turned out that the “stakeholders” are not convinced of the necessity of such a code, 
that working on such a code is “an expensive and time–consuming solution looking 
for a problem.”120 These critics are, however, missing the point. In the context of 
constitutive rhetoric, practical arguments for or against a European civil code itself 
are immaterial. It is about constituting a “European audience”. 
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